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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
aware of the intended use of the property, but it did not disclose
whether the defendant-vendor knew of the particular zoning
ordinance which would have prevented its use. Had the vendor
possessed such knowledge, the case would seem to have fallen
under the provisions of the Code dealing with fraud,2 6 and the
contract would have been voidable. Even assuming that the de-
fendant did not know of the ordinance and that both parties
were merely in error, the result would be the same,27 because the
error was as to the principal cause. Thus, it would seem that
realization of the vendee's belief that the property could be used
as intended without the interference of zoning restrictions might
be considered a tacit condition to the enforcement of the con-
tract.2
8
In holding that a prospective vendee is not obliged to investi-
gate zoning restrictions except where the appearance of the
neighborhood should put him on notice of the possibility of
restrictions which would preclude the intended use, the court
adopted a realistic and desirable approach. It is often imprac-
tical and difficult for a prospective vendee to determine the
existence of such ordinances, and, in addition, the vendor, by
virtue of his possession and ownership, is more apt to have been
informed of their existence.
Maurice J. Naquin
LABOR LAW - THE PERENNIAL PREEMPTION PROBLEM
Plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract in a state
court for wrongful expulsion from the defendant union, and
asked for restoration of membership and damages for loss of
wages and for mental suffering. Defendant conceded the state
court jurisdiction to order plaintiff's reinstatement, but con-
tended that the Taft-Hartley Act left the state without power
to fill out this remedy by an award of damages for loss of wages
and mental suffering. The lower court gave judgment for the
plaintiff on both issues. The court of appeals affirmed and the
State Supreme Court denied a petition for hearing. On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The state
same, for Article 1846, dealing with error of law, specifically provides a means of
recovering what has been given or paid under error of law.
26. See LA. CIVM CODE art. 1847(5), (6) (1870).
27. See id. art. 1819 et seq.
28. See id. arts. 1824, 1827.
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court has jurisdiction even though the conduct involved was an
unfair labor practice, since possible conflict which the state ac-
tion may have with the federal policy is too remote. Association
of Machinists v. Gonzales, 42 L.R.R.M. 2135 (U. S. 1958). In
another case decided the same day, plaintiff, a non-member of
the defendant union and a non-striker, brought an action in a
state court to recover compensatory and punitive damages from
the union for having maliciously prevented him from engaging
in his lawful occupation by unlawful mass picketing in further-
ance of a strike. The lower court sustained defendant's objec-
tion that the NLRB had jurisdiction to the exclusion of the state
court. The State Supreme Court reversed and the lower court,
on remand, gave judgment for the plaintiff. The State Supreme
Court affirmed. On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, held, affirmed. The state has jurisdiction to award dam-
ages to an employee for injuries sustained as a result of a union's
tortious conduct notwithstanding the possibility that the conduct
in question involved an unfair labor practice. United Automobile
Workers v. Russell, 42 L.R.R.M. 2142 (U. S. 1958).
The power to regulate commerce is among those powers ex-
pressly granted to the federal government by the Constitution.1
By virtue of its power over interstate commerce, Congress has
regulated the field of labor management relations.2 Under the
supremacy clause of the Constitution,8 federal legislation pur-
suant to those delegated powers precludes state action where the
two conflict or where Congress manifests an intention to preempt
the field. Congress is given this grant of superiority primarily
because of the necessity for uniformity of regulation in those
areas of the law which affect the nation as a whole. 4 An area
will require uniformity of regulation when it is national in scope
and character.5 In these areas which are national in scope and
character, the states are prohibited to act in the absence of con-
gressional consent notwithstanding a complete absence of fed-
eral legislation.6 However, where the area is local in scope and
character, there is less need for uniformity of regulation7 and
1. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
3. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
4. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851).
5. Ibid.
6. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
7. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851).
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the states can act in the absence of federal legislation." Even
though there is existing federal legislation, a state may still act
concurrently, provided no conflict results and provided further
that Congress has not shown an intent to occupy the field ex-
clusively. 9 The passage of the Labor Management Relations Act
was indicative of congressional determination that certain areas
within the field of labor relations required uniformity of regula-
tion. 10 Congressional intent reflected by legislation within these
areas must be respected even though some matters are left un-
regulated." The areas preempted by the act are not susceptible
of fixed metes and bounds but must be judicially defined in a
case by case method. 12 Case law indicates that states may not
enjoin union activity which constitutes an unfair labor practice
under the act,'8 or enjoin that which is protected by the act 4
It remains unsettled which activity not specifically covered by
the act is to be treated as protected activity.15 Cases falling with-
in this fringe area are decided on their merits by the Court.' 6
8. Ibid.
9. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942). See also H. P.
Hood & Sons Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
10. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
11. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957). Appellant sought
relief from the NLRB, which declined jurisdiction over the controversy. Re-
lief was then sought and obtained at the hands of the state board. On ap-
peal, the United States Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the
NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction, even though they had in fact declined to exer-
cise it. The case is fully discussed in Comment, 18 LOUISTANA LAW REVIEW 149
(1957). See also Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board,
330 U.S. 767 (1947), in which the same legal theory was advanced to support
the Court's decision that a grant of power to a federal agency, although not exer-
cised, preempts the field.
12. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
13. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). The union was charged
with violation of the state's "Little Wagner Act" by coercing an employer to
coerce his employees to join the union. This rather elaborate charge was made
due to the non-existence of any sanctions over union activity at this time. The
Court denied jurisdiction to the state, since the alleged grievance was within the
NLRB's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices.
14. International Union of United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S.
454 (1950), wherein it was held that a state prohibition of the right to strike
unless certain state procedures were complied with was in conflict with the Taft-
Hartley Act which expressly granted such a right to the union. See also Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
15. The Court's expressions on this point have varied. In UAWA v. WERB,
336 U.S. 245 (1949), it was held that a series of unscheduled strikes called with-
out warning for the purpose of harassing the employer was unprotected activity
under the NLRA and hence could be regulated by the state. However, in Garner
v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), the Court acknowledged the fact that
the failure of the federal law to prohibit certain activity involving economic pres-
sure in support of a union's lawful demands may imply a conscious intent to
remove such activity from all government regulation.
16. The case of Textile Workers Union of America, CIO v. NLRB, 227 F.2d
409 (D. C. Cir. 1955) dealt with the identical issue raised in the case of Garner
v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), note 15 supra. The Court of Appeals
NOTES
It has been held that the states may not take action that fetters
rights which are specifically covered by the act,17 or constitutes
a counterpart to its regulatory scheme,' or duplicates its rem-
edies.' 9 The state may not entertain questions involving cer-
tification of bargaining representatives, even though the NLRB
declines jurisdiction.20 The Court has even held that a state must
voluntarily refuse jurisdiction over an action for injunctive re-
lief whenever the facts may reasonably be said to bring the con-
troversy within a section of the act.2' It should be remembered
that Congress has given authority to the NLRB to cede jurisdic-
tion to the state boards in some instances. 22 Such a cession has
not been made to date. 23 Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the
states are completely denied control over all phases of labor re-
lations. 24 The Court has repeatedly stated that Congress had no
intention of impairing the state's power over traditionally local
matters such as public safety and order. 25 Indeed, it is felt that
Congress designedly left open an area for state control in rela-
tion to coercive activities or tactics in labor controversies. 26 In
view of this, a state has been allowed to act where mass picketing
has taken place,27 or where the union engages in frequent un-
announced work stoppages.2  Generally, a state's exercise of its
police power will be sanctioned whenever it is used to punish or
prevent violence in connection with labor disputes. 29 Whatever
the limitations may be on state jurisdiction to enjoin unfair
labor practices, several states have asserted that these limita-
held that the act did not forbid or limit the use of economic pressure in support of
lawful demands aside from such specified conduct such as jurisdictional strikes
and secondary boycotts. Unfortunately, the writ of certiorari was denied by the
United States Supreme Court, so this area of the law remains hazy.
17. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
18. International Union of United Automobile A. & A.I.E. v. O'Brien, 339
U.S. 454 (1950).
19. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
20. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
21. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
22. 61 STAT. 146, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1947).
23. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
24. International Union, AAWA v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245 (1949); Allen-
Bradley Local 1111, United Electrical Workers v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
25. United Automobile Workers v. WERB, 351 U.S. 266 (1956); Allen-
Bradley Local 1111, United Electrical Workers v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740, 749
(1942), in which the Court stated that "an intention of Congress to exclude
States from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested."
26. International Union, AAWA v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) ; Allen-Bradley
Local 1111, United Electrical Workers v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
27. Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Electrical Workers v. WERB, 315 U.S.
740 (1942).
28. International Union, AAWA v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
29. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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tions are inapplicable to a tort action although the conduct upon
which it is based may also be an unfair labor practice.3 0 The
case of United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Co. was
the first Supreme Court expression on the validity of this asser-
tion."' There, the defendant union threatened the plaintiff's em-
ployees with violence, which resulted in their leaving the job
to the detriment of the plaintiff. The state court awarded dam-
ages based on a common law tort, although the conduct involved
was also an unfair labor practice. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed, finding no conflict between the state and fed-
eral law because the remedy given by the state court was not
provided for in the federal act. Further, the Court held that
the state in this case was enforcing a private right, whereas the
federal statute dealt with public rights.
The Russell case, one of the instant cases, deals with violence
in connection with picketing, which resulted in preventing the
plaintiff from enjoying his lawful occupation. Disregarding the
distinction in the remedies for the moment, the Laburnum case
and the Russell case are comparable in that in both a common
law tort was involved, with redress to the state courts possible.
The Gonzales case, the other case which is the subject of this
Note, is also comparable to an earlier Supreme Court decision
which held that regulation of union membership matters rela-
tive to collective bargaining contracts was not in conflict with
the federal act.82 However, the two instant cases go a step fur-
ther than their predecessors by expressly holding that the states
not only had jurisdiction over the subject matter, but could also
award the remedy of back pay in conjunction with tort and
breach of contract damages. This is the same type remedy which
the NLRB may grant in limited fashion under Section 10 (c) of
the federal act.88 According to these two cases, the prohibition
against duplication of remedies is inapplicable insofar as back
30. Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 42 L.R.R.M. 2135 (U.S. 1958);
Russell v. UAW, 258 Ala. 615, 64 So.2d 384 (1953) ; Kuzma v. Millinery Workers
Union, 27 N.J. Super. 579, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953) ; Barile v. Fisher, 197
Misc. 493, 94 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
31. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
32. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. WERB. 336 U.S. 301 (1949). This case
actually allowed a state to award the remedy of back pay, but the opinion did not
expressly consider the question of whether such an award of back pay would be a
duplication of a remedy afforded by the federal act. Rather, the opinion was
concerned with whether or not the state could validly regulate the subject matter
involved. Answering this in the affirmative, the remedy of the back pay award
was not questioned.
33. 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952).
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pay is concerned, when the controversy is open to state juris-
diction, at least with reference to injuries sustained as a result
of unlawful picketing or unlawful expulsion. There appears to
be no good reason to say that allowance of the back pay remedy
to the states will not be extended to include all other contro-
versies now open to state jurisdiction in the field of labor rela-
tions, providing that damages are appropriate and wages were
lost by the complaining party. In support of their decision, the
majority of the Court stated that Congress had not intended to
preempt the field of damages recoverable from tortious conduct
by the provision for back pay awards in the act.8 4 It was felt by
the majority that the mere possibility of partial relief in the
form of back pay at the hands of the federal agency was insuf-
ficient justification for refusing an employee the right to recover
all damages in a state court sustained as a result of tortious
conduct, even though this same conduct might be an unfair labor
practice.3 5 As in the Laburnum case, the Court in the two in-
stant cases distinguished those cases which had prohibited state
action in conflict with the federal remedy. The Court stated that
in those cases it was concerned lest one forum would enjoin, as
illegal, conduct which the other forum would find legal, or that
state courts would restrict the exercise of rights guaranteed by
the federal act.36 Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas dis-
sented in both of the instant cases, basing their objections on the
fact that this conduct was an unfair labor practice and hence
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 3 7 The dissent-
ing judges also felt that allowance of this form of relief by state
action was a duplication of the federal remedy provided for in
the act.88
34. United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 42 L.R.R.M. 2142, 2146 (U.S.
1958), in which the Court states: "We conclude that an employee's right to re-
cover all damages caused him by this kind of tortious conduct cannot be fairly
said to be pre-empted without a clearer declaration of congressional policy then
we find there." (Emphasis added.)
35. Id. at 2145, wherein the Court states: "The power to order affirmative
relief under section 10(c) is merely incidental to the primary purpose of Congress
to stop and to prevent unfair labor practices. Congress did not intend to establish
a general scheme authorizing the Board to award full compensatory damages
for injuries caused by wrongful conduct." See also Association of Machinists v.
Gonzales, 42 L.R.R.M. 2135, 2137 (U.S. 1958), wherein the court said in part
that "the possibility of partial relief from the Board does not, in such a case as is
here presented, deprive a party from available state remedies for all damages
suffered."
36. United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 42 L.R.R.M. 2142, 2146 (U.S.
1958).
37. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
38. United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 42 L.R.R.M. 2142, 2148 (U.S.
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In the two instant cases, the majority relied heavily on the
Laburnum decision in allowing the states jurisdiction over con-
duct which involved unfair labor practices. In the Laburnum
case, the majority justified its position by distinguishing be-
tween private and public rights, a distinction which had pre-
viously been discarded as too ambiguous a classification upon
which to predicate a principle of constitutional law.3 9 Again, the
Laburnum case differed from prior cases in that state action
was held to be permissible even though it affected activity which
was clearly an unfair labor practice.40 In view of these weak-
nesses in the Laburnum decision, it is submitted that the ma-
jority reliance upon Laburnum in the instant cases was not
dictated by considerations of its force as legal precedent or
demands of legal reasoning. Rather, the reliance upon Laburnum
is better explained as a legal rationalization of what the majority
viewed as a desirable policy result. The views expressed in the
dissenting opinion on duplication of remedies in the two instant
cases seem to be in accord with the legislative history of the
federal act. Senator Taft recognized the possibility of a situa-
tion involving dual remedies but spoke of such only in relation
to illegal acts of such a nature that the main remedy would be a
criminal prosecution under state law.41 Nevertheless, the ma-
jority felt that earlier declarations of preemption by the act
were not controlling in the two instant cases. It seems that the
Court, in order to do justice, was obliged to sanction the awards
given by the states in the two instant cases, though these awards
included back pay which in turn was a duplication in part of an
existing federal remedy. 42 It seems that the instant decisions
were influenced to a large degree by the inadequacy of the fed-
eral relief available at the hands of the NLRB.43 This inadequacy
1958) ; Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 42 L.R.R.M. 2135, 2139 (U.S.
1958).
39. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
40. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955) ; Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Re-
lations Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947). Although these cases are concerned with
the validity of state injunctive action, they support the contention made in theory.
41. 93 Cong. Rec. 4437 (1947), where Senator Taft said: "I may say further
that one of the arguments has suggested that in case this provision covered vio-
lence, it duplicated State law. I wish to point out that the provisions agreed to
by the committee covering unfair labor practices on the part of labor unions also
might duplicate to some extent that state law. Secondary boycotts, jurisdictional
strikes, and so forth, may involve some violation of state law respecting violence
which may be criminal, and so to some extent the measure may be duplicating the
remedy existing under State law. But that in my opinion, is no valid argument."
(Emphasis added.)
42. Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 42 L.R.R.M. 2135, 2139 (1958).
43. See discussion in note 35 supra.
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of federal relief prompted the court to conclude that Congress
did not intend to establish a general scheme authorizing the
Board to award full compensatory damages for injuries sus-
tained due to wrongful conduct. 44 Thus, the provision for back
pay, being only incidental to the primary purpose of Congress
to stop and prevent unfair labor practices, does not preempt re-
covery in the field of damages for conduct which may be the
basis for a tort or breach of contract action.
The two instant cases evidence a balance struck by the Court
between the individual's rights and those of the union. The
Laburnum requisites were met in that Congress had not pro-
vided an adequate remedy and state courts are therefore not
precluded from exercising jurisdiction. 45 These two cases, com-
bined with the Laburnum decision, reflect the Court's change of
attitude regarding federal preemption in the field of labor re-
lations by virtue of the Labor Management Act. Earlier deci-
sions invalidated state action only remotely in conflict with the
act.46 Further, the Court had held in the past that the existence
of gaps in the remedial legislation was no license for the states
to fashion correctives. 47 Undoubtedly, the court was formerly
content that Congress, being aware of the injustice which re-
sulted from the invalidation of state action by preemption, could
remedy the situation at will. However, Congress remained silent.
It is submitted that the Court grew impatient at the inaction of
Congress and, in order to prevent further injustice, deviated
from its former policy of mechanical application of preemption
principles in the field of labor relations.
Charley Quienalty
MINERAL LAW- PRESCRIPTION OF MINERAL LEASES
Plaintiff sued for cancellation of a mineral lease insofar as it
affected his property on the ground of prescription. The defend-
ants had not explored for minerals for a period in excess of ten
years. In 1941, plaintiff's vendor granted a mineral lease, cov-
ering some 19,000 acres on several non-contiguous tracts for a
44. See discussion in note 35 supra.
45. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Co., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
46. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Re-
lations Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
47. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
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